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The  current institutional  amangement  pernits the Federal  Reserve  to
delay releasing directives adopted  at Federal  0pen  l'larket  Committee
meetings. The  directive instructs the trading desk  how  to conduct  open
mdrket  operations  during  the intermeeting  period by indicating the desired
rrdegree  of pressure  on reserve  positions."  Since  the public is not privy ro
these instructions, deferring the announcement  of the djrective amounts  to
differentiating  between  the information  sets of the monetary  authority and
the public.  Policymakers  have  all  the information  the public  has,  plus some
private information.  Indeed,  central bank  secrecy  is designed  to naintain
information asymmetry.
Kydiand  and  Prescott (1977)  and  later Baro and  Gordon  (1983)  described
a non-cooperative  garne  played  by the monetary  authority and  the public.  In
this  game,  the monetary  authonity  has  an incentive  to create surprise money
grolrth.  Barro  and  Gordon  argued  that such  incentives  lead to a sub-optjnal
equilibriun in the discretionary  regime. In order  to nitigate the central
bank's incentive to create  positive shocks  to money  growth,  the publ  ic sets
its  expectations  high so that the marginal  benefjt of a surprise  money  shock
is  less than or equal  to the narginal costs of higher  money  growth.  Inequilibrium,  therefore,  the inflation rate is high  and  and  surprise
inflation  is equal  to zero.  An  inflatjon  bias results because  the monetary
authority is not able to credibly rrpre-conmit'r  to a constant-growth  rate
policy.  Instead, if  expected  money  growth  is constant,  the pol  icynakerrs
objective function is maximized  when  money  growth  is positve.  Thus  it  is
the absence  of pre-conmi  trnent  that leads  to a Pareto  inferior  outcone.
Canzoneri  (1985)  argued  that private information  plays a very
important  role in this  game. Taylor (1983)  maintained  that  in games
without private information, jnstitutjons would  develop  to resolve  the pre-
commi  tment  problem. [,lith  private information,  however,  Canzoneri  argued
that the public was  unab1e  to discern  between  a policyraker reneging  and  a
stochastic shock. Thus,  observed  pollcymaker  behavioris a noisy signal of
the monetary  authority's "intention"  to fight inflation.
In contrast to the benefits that private information  bestows  upon  the
monetary  authority, individuals "lose" when  actual noney  growth  deviates
from its  forecasted  value.l/  There  js an incentive  for  the public to reduce
its  uncertainty about  the monetary  authorityrs preferences  jn order to
minimize  unanticjpated  money  growth. Since  private information  plays a role
in the monetary  authority's ability  to create surprise  money  grobrth,  the
public can  (at least partially) offset this ability,  and  hence  reduce
uncertainty about  the rate of money  growth,  by reducing  informational
asymmetries.  The  phenonenon  of "Fed  watching"  is a practical application of
this  strategy.  Indjviduals  monitor  Federal  Reserve  behavior  seeking
infornation to reduce  uncertainty  about  money  growth  plans.  Furthermore,
Fed  watchjng  reduces  the payoff to the monetary  authority resulting from
surpri  se money  creat  i  on.The  purpose  of thjs  paper  is to analyze  the effect that augnenting
people's infonnation  sets would  have  within the context  of a nacroeconomjc
policy gane. The  gane  between  the monetary  authorjty and  agents  is affected
in two ways.  First,  agents  acquire  information  strategjcally  in order to
restrain the monetary  authority's incentive  to create surprise  money  growth.
Increased  Fed  watching,  for  example,  lowers  the nonetary  authorityrs
welfare.  Consequently,  the likelihood increases  that the monetary  authority
finds the payoff associated  with co0mitting  to a constant-growth  rule
superior  to that associated  with discretionary  policy actions.
Secondly,  agents  choose  the "optinal" quantity of augmented
information.  Fo1  lowing  Darby  (1976)  and  Verrachja  (1982),  information
acquisition  is costly,  Another  strategic  consideration  in this game  is how
Federal  Reserve  secrecy  affects the cost of acquiring information.  Since
Fed  watching  lowers  po1  icynaker's  welfare, an effective counter-  strategy may
be additional secrecy,  with the intention of lowering  the optimal level of
'information  acquisition.  From  the monetary  authority's perspective,  an
increase  in the rrdegree  of secrecy"  is justified  if  the marginal  gain in the
public's forecast effor variance  js greater than the marginal  cost of such
efforts.
The  paper  proceeds  as follows.  Section  2 describes  a monetary  policy
game  incorporating  Fed-watching  behavior. How  monitoring  can  affect the
po1  icymakerrs  welfare  under  rules or discretion  is discussed  in Section  3.
Section  4 introduces  secrecy  jnto the model  as a decision  variable for  the
central bank.  Section  5 surnmarizes  the results.
II.  The  Set-up  of the Mode.l
In formulating  policy, the monetary  authority is viewed  as beingsubject to various  political  and  econonic  forces.  The  impact  of these
forces is manifested  as changes  in policymaker  rrpreferences."  The  term
preferences  refers to the weight  pol  icymakers  place  on stimulating econonic
activity  versus  controlling inflation.  If  the monetary  authority did not
value the benefits of unanticipated  money  growth,  the policy game  would  be
resolved.2/  The  public js uncertain  about  the nonetary  authority's
preferences. The  presence  of asyrnnetric  infornation increases  the incentive
of the policymaker  to avoid  pre-commitment  to a rate of monetary  growth.
Before  specifying  the objective functjons of the monetary  authorjty and
(a representative  agent  of)  the public, we  need  to outline the structure of
the pol  icy game  and  rnake  the sequence  of events  explicit.  Fjrst,  a
policymaker  preference  shock  occurs.  The  exact  nature  of thjs  shock  is the
private informatjon  of the nonetary  authority.  Next, the public forecasts
this  preference  shock;  the quality of this forecast depends  on the level of
resources  devoted  to "monjtorjng"  the monetary  authority.3/  Eased  on an
information  set rraugnented"  by Fed  watching,  the public then forms
expectations  of the preference  shock  and  future money  growth.  F'ina1ly,  the
policymaker  chooses  the rate of money  growth  taking agentrs  expectations  as
g  i  ven.
In the near-term,  it  is assumed  that the poljcyrnaker  chooses  the rate
of money  growth  based  on two  ultimate objectives: price stability  and
economic  growth.4/  Money  growth  is positively related to money  growth.  The
rate of growth  of real economic  activity  is positively related to the
unantjcipated  part of rnoney  growth. Consequentiy,  the monetary  authority's
means  of achjeving  changes  in economic  growth  are through  surprjse
i  nf  .l 
ati  on.Fornally,  the policwaker's  objective  function  is to
-.
(l)  max  E  Bi [[mi - E(mi  lI:)lgi  -  ]]I)iztz],1t
mi  i=0
where  mi denotes  money  growth  in period  i;  E(m1  l11) is the publicrs
forecasts of mi, given  the infornatjon set,Ii;  and  B is the discount  factor.
The  variable 0i  reflects the poljcymaker's  preferences  for  stimulating
economic  activity relative to controlljng  inflation.  As  0i  increases,  the
policymaker  is wiIling to bear  a higher  rate of inflatjon in order  to
further stimulate economic  activity.  Because  we  assume  that these
preferences  are not serially  correldted, the monetary  authorjty takes the
publicrs current and  future forecasts  of money  growth  as given.  Since
future expectations  are independent  of the nonetary  authority's choice  of
current money  growth,  the nonetary  authority's maxinization  problem  can  be
reduced  to the one-period  problem  described  by
(la) rnax lmi - E(milIi)l0i  -  $:)2/2.
ni
Equations  (1) and  (la)  imply  that non-zero  noney  growth  has  a negative
impact  on the monetdry  authority's welfare, but that surprise  money  growth
has  a positive impact.
It  is assumed  that Qi is random  and  is described  by
(2) Si  =A  +  vi.
Policymaker  preferences  are on average  A, and  variable vi  is  independently
and  identical  1y  distributed  N(0,4).
5Maxinizing  (la) with respect  to mi  vields
(3)  mi  =0i  =A  +  vi.
According  to equation  (3), the selection  of the rate of money  growth  depends
directly  upon  the relative importance  of stjrnulating  economjc  activity
versus  creating additional jnflation.  Note  that jn the absence  of any
public information  about  vi,  the expected  money  growth  rate is equal  to A.
It  is conmon  in the macroeconomic  pollcy game  literature  for the public
to base  their  expectations  on an informatjon  set that includes  a conjecture
of policymaker  preferences. The  approach  taken  in this  paper,  however,  is
to allow agents  to augment  theirinformation  sets by expending  resources.
The  idea is that additional inforrnation  returns less unanticipated  money
gror,'/th,  and  hence  the public suffers lolrers  its  losses  to surprise
inflatjon.  Augmented  jnfornation pernits the public to get an estinate of
what  the pol  icymaker's  contenporaneous  preference  shock. Specifically,
agents  benefit fron expending  resources  through  lower  variance  of their
money  growth  forecast errors.  For the sake  of simplicity,  it  is assuned
that the public consists  of a set of identical individuals. Consequently,
the public's problen  rnay  be treated from  the perspective  of a representative
agent.  6/
Fornally. the representatjve  agent's  behavior  is characterized  as




Ii(o.')  represents  the infornation set fron which  agents  form  their
.*O"lauaron..  Z/  fhis infornation set consists  of knowledge  of the generalmotivation  of the nonetary  authority (i.e.,  knowledge  of the functional form
of the monetary  authorityts maximjzatjon  problem  and  that mi = 0i),
knowledge  of the distribution of the nonetary  authority's preferences  (i.e.,
..e 'i'
+i  = A  +  vi,  E(vi) = 0, Var(vi)  = ouz),  ana  an  estinate  of the
contemporaneous  pol  i cjmaker  preference  shock,
fol lowing  propertj  es:
This estimate  has  the
E  I.,.  .,€t  -  ^  e'7 '  ? Ervi  -  uit  = u, rt(vi  - vi)-t  = o;,
rtu!{ui -  vfll  = o, E[(vi(vi  - vi)1 = d,gl uno
,  p.  , Elvj(vi  -vi)l  =  0foralli^i.
The  first  two  conditions  indicate  that the public's estjmate  of the
preference  shock  is unbiased  and  has  a variance  oo2.  The  public's forecast
of the preference  shock  is assumed  to be fixed unl tnu."tor.  does  not covary
with the forecast error.  Alternatively, the preference  shock  does  covary
with the forecast error. with the covariance  being  equal  to o.2. Final1y,
the preference  shock  is not serially  correlated  with the forelast error.
The  publ  ic can inprove  (in the sense  of a lower  forecast error
variance) its  estimate  of the preference  shock  by expending  resources  on
information  acquisition.  C1o^21  is the amount  of resources  expended  to get a
forecast of the po.i  icymaker's  preference  shock  of quality oo2.  The
properties  of this "cost"  function  are:  C' .0,  C"  > 0, C(  ouz)  = 0, and
C(0) =.o.  The  more  resources  devoted  to uncovering  the monetary  authorityrs
preferences  the better is the public's estimate  of the preference  shock,
c
i,e.,  the iower  o^4. If  no resources  are expended  then agents  will  have  no
c
infornation about  the contenporaneous  preference  shock  aside  from  knowledge
of its  distrjbutjon, 1.e-^ o2 = o2-  In the nodels  where  Fed-watching '.: "e
behavior  is not considered,  it  is assumed  that agents  know  the forecasterror variance  and  it  is fixed.  Agents  can  improve  their  estimate  of the
preference  shock,  however,  by increasing  the amount  of resources  devoted  to
monitoring  the monetary  authority.  In the linit,  devoting  an  infinite
quantity of resources  to rnonitoring  the policwaker would  result  in the
information  sets for monetary  authority and  the public being  identical.
Thus,  as private information  approaches  zero, the limiting  distribution  of
the forecast errors degenerates.  Hence,  forecast errors converge  to zero
with probabil  ity one.
Given  an estjmate  of the policymaker's  preference  shock  of quality d,
expected  money  growth is
(5) EImilIr(l)l rtOilrl(o$l = A +v!.
Substituting  (3) and  (5) into (4), the public's problem  is to
(6) max  -r[(vi -  ullzl -  c(d) ,
4
which  is equivalent  to
(6a) max  4  c(oez).
^2 "e
The  fjrst  order  conditjon  for an  interior solution  implies  that the optimal
degree  of forecast accuracy,  o$,  wiff  satjsfy
(7)  c'(ol)  = -1.
From  equation  (7) and  the second  order conditions, it  is obvious  that
anything  that increases  the marginal  cost of monitoring  the monetaryauthority (i.e.,  shifts the C'( ) schedule  downward)  causes  the public  to
acquire  forecasts  that are less accurate  (oj rliglt"t1  '
t{hat  effect does  the publ  ic's ab'ility to forecast policymaker
oreference  shock  have  on the policymaker's  welfare level?  From  equations
(1a), (3) and  (5),  the monetary  authority's welfare level is represented  as
(8)  E[(A +vi  -  A  -  v?)(A+vi)-(A  +vilzlll
="3  -4,,  -n?/2.
Equation  (8) represents  the payoff to the monetary  authority under
different  values  of the forecast error variance'  Accordingly'  equation  (8)
indicates that the payoff to the monetary  authority is directly  related to
the forecast error variance  so that an increase  in Fed  watching  lowers
policymaker  }relfare.  Obviously'  the monetary  authority would  prefer agents
to have  less information  about  its  preferences,  since a higher d  intttuttt
the monetary  authority's welfare.  If  the public has  a clearer picture of
theobjectivesofthemonetaryauthor.ity,then.itjsless.like.lythatthe
monetary  authority will  choose  to generate  surprise  money  growth  as an
optinal pol  i  cy.
III.  Rules  vs. D'iscretion  Revisited
Howdoesincorporatingthepub.lic.s,informat,ion-seekingbehavioraffect
the policymaker's  choice  between  rules and  discretion? Following  Barro  and
Gordon  (1983),  the issue  concerns  whether  the pol  icymaker  attains a higher
payoff  with "binding  cotmfli  tnents"  (i.e.'  rules) or with discretionary
po1  i  cy.
To compare  payoffs  under  the alternative institutions,  we  will  considertwo extreme  cases  of  informational asyrnrnetry.  F.irst,  suppose  that  agents
have  perfect jnformation  about  the preferences  of the monetary  author.ity.
(This is  the case  analyzed  in Barro  and  Gordon.) Perfect information  is
equivalent  to private information  bejng  absent,  hence,  o"2  = g.  From
equation  (8).  the policymaker's  !,elfare with discretionaly monetary  policy
tt
is  -oi  -  A'/2.  If,  however,  policymakers  would  follow a money  growth  rule,
i.e.,  mi = 0, then  the welfare  level is zero.  Thus,  consistent  brith  the
Baffo and  Gordon  findjngs, brhen  private information  is  absent  the nonetary
authority prefers pre-conmi  tment  to a rule to discretion.
Secondly,  consider  a corner  solutjon where  the marginal  costs of Fed
watching  are so high that monitoring  activity  is zero,  t4ithout  further
insight into the contemporaneous  preference  shock,  agents  are assumed  to
know  that these  shocks  are distributed nean  zero, variance  ouz.  Thjs
essentially is the assunptjon  invoked  by Cukierman  and  Meltzer.  Setting
7r)2
o.' = ou'  in equation  (8) yields a payoff equal  to ou'  /2  -  A'/?.  Provided
the variance  of preference  shocks  is  larger than  A2, policymakers  will
prefer discretion to a zero-growth  rule.  Thus,  with asynrnetric  information,
the more  variable are the nonetary  authority's preferences,  the more  fikely
is it  that discretion  will  be  the desired  policy practice.
An analysis of the two extreme  cases  highlights the role that private
informatjon  plays .in  deternining  whether  cornmi  tment  to a rule or discretjon
'is the superior outcome  from  the nonetary  authority's perspectjve. A1  lowing
the public to augment  their  jnformatjon  sets by monitoring  Federal  Reserve
behavior  directly  affects the forecast error variance  of the preference
shock,  and  hence  the Federal  Reserve's  payoff.  Indeed,  the analysis
suggests  that between  the two  extrene  cases  characterized  by full  and  zero
10information, there exists an intermediate  case  where  the policymaker  is
indifferent  between  comnitting  to a rule and  practicing djscretion.  If  the
publicrs  monitoring  yields a forecast  emor variance  above  this "critical"
value  (i.e.,  where  the payoff  to discretion  is positive), then  the monetary
authority's  welfare  level is higher  under  djscretion.  Converseiy,  if  the
forecast error variance  is below  the critical  value, pollcymakers  achieve
higher  welfare level by pre-commjttjng  to a zero-growth  rule pol'icy.  Thus,
the degree  to which  nonitoring of the policymaker  is possible  plays an
significant role jn the rules vs. discretion  debate.
How  does  Fed-watching  behavior  relate to the points nade  by Taylor and
Canzoneri  concerning  the pre-commi  tment  problen? Canzoneri  noted  that
private infornation makes  resolut'ion  of the pre-commltment  problem  nore
difficult.  There  are prinrarily for two  reasons  why  these  difficuities
arise.  First,  agents  would  not be able to  infer the "source"  of the shock.
That is,  deviations  frorn  expected  money  growth  couid  reflect  either central
bank  behavior  or some  stochastic  event.  Secondly,  the monetary  authority
does  not wish  to be  bound  by a rule since  djscretion  yields a higher  payoff.
In contrast, without private infonnation  the monetary  authoroity obtains its
highest  payoff under  a rule policy.  Based  on the payoffs  wjth and  without
asymmetri  c information,  the policyraker  would  likely  facilitate  the
developnent  of institutions  to resolve  the pre-commitment  problen  in a world
where  private informatjon  is absent. The  policynaker,  however,  is more
ljkely  to deter the development  of such  institutions when  asymmetric
information  exi  sts.
One  implication of this  analysis is that the exjstence  of asymnetr.i  c
jnforrnation  is central to the policynakerrs  attitude concerning  the
t1resolution of the pre-commi  tment  problem. The  policymaker  brould  not wish to
pre-conmit  when  private inforrnation  is present  because  higher  payoffs  can  be
achieved  under  discretion.  In this  paper,  however,  the existence  of private
information  js not a sufficient  condition  for  discretion pol  icy to be the
dominant  policy.  Rather,  it  js the degree  to which  private information
exists, represented  bV  d,  whlch  is important. Suppose  o.2  is nositive and
the payoff calculated  using  equation  (8) is negative. The  central bank
could obtain a higher  payoff, equal  to zero, by pre-committing  to a zero-
growth  rule.  The  dominance  of the rule pol  icy occurs  despite  a non-zero
forecast error variance.  Moreover,  the central bank  would  prefer to pre-
commit  to attain the naxjmum  payoff.  Thus,  public pressure  on the monetary
authority in the forrn  of Fed  watching  may  effectively resolve  the pre-
comni  tnent Drob  I  em.
IV.  Secrecy  as a Federal  Reserve  Strateqy
Secrecy  is crucial to naintaining informational  asynmetry  between  the
monetary  authority and  the public.  As  Goodfriend  (1986)  points out,
"Release  of the Directive would  reduce  the cost of acquiring information
about  FOMC  po1icy."  (pS.  79).  lljthout  secrecy,  people  could  costlessly
obtain information  about  Federal  Reserve  preferences. Conversely,  efforts
to obstruct  the publicrs  monitoring  behavior,  i.e.,  more  secrecy,  would
raise the cost of acquiring  jnformation  about  the monetary  authority's
preferences. Indeed,  the policymaker  would  have  an incentive to become  more
secretive so that the costs of Fed  watching  are increased  and  the central
bank's  private information  js maintained.
In the macroeconomic  pol  icy game  literature,  secrecy  serves  a very
LZimportant  purpose: agents  cannot  infer the policynakers  "true" preferences
because  of the presence  of asymmetr.ic  informatjon.9/  Backus  and  Drjffill
(1985)  and  Barro (1986)  show  that secrecy  permits  the monetary  authority to
send  0false" signa.ls  to agents  about  the policymakerrs  preferences  toward
fighting inflation versus  stimulating  econom.i  c activity.
In Cukiennan  and  Meltzer (1986),  the monetary  authority is allowed  to
pre-commit  to a degree  of secrecy  by selecting a technology  which  adds  a
random  conponent  to  planned  money  growth.  only actual noney  growth js
observed  by individuals.  Consequently,  it  is impossible  to detect whether
unanticipated  money  growth  was  the result of a preference  shock  or a control
shock. The  random  control errors make  secrecy  possible  because  control
shocks  veil  policymaker's  preferences. llithout these  control effors,  the
public would  be able to infer policymaker  preferences  through  observed
rnoney  growth rates.
In all  three papers,  the inforrnation  sets avajlable to the public are
largely records  of past observed  po1  i  cynaker  behavior. Consequently,
secrecy  affects the value  of this  'information  through  noisy historical  data.
Secrecy  can  affect the costs of acquiring  information  in the curent  period
as well as affect the infornation content  of past money  growth  observations.
To formally analyze  the optimal  degree  of secrecy,  the model  specified
jn Section  II  js modjfied  to include  the effect of secrecy  on  the
household's  choice  of information. The  central  bank  is treated  as the
"dorninant"  player in this  game,  while agents  act as followers and  adjust
their  decisions  according  to the level of secrecy  determjned  by the nonetary
authority.l0/  The  monetary  authority decides  on how  much  effort  to devote
to secrecy  after the policymaker's  preference  shock  occurs  and  before  thepublic forecasts the preference  shock.
3.l-  The  Aqentr  s Problem
Formally,  the public's objective  function  is characterized  as:
22
(e) rul  -%  - C(o.,  5)
?-
%
where  S denotes  the policymaker's  efforts to maintain  secrecy. The
properties of the cost function are: C1  .  0, Cll t  0, CZ  > 0 and
222
C1(ou,0)  = 0.  Equation  (9) is also  subject  to the constraint  that oe.  ou.
Consequently,  the Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for the public's naxjmization
problem  are given by
(10a)  -1  -Ct-1,  <  0
2
(b)  o  [-1  -C1 -I,l  =0
e-
22
(c)  (ou  - o")  :  0
tI
(d)  I,(ou - o.)  =  0.
where  tr. is the Lagrangian  multiplier.  According  to equations  (10a-d),  an
L22
'interior  maximum  will  exjst (i.e.,  ou  )  ou)  provided  the marginal  cost  of
acqu'iring  jnforrnation  is greater  than -1 for  given  values  of S.  In other
words,  a sufficient  condition  for an interior  naximum  is that the marginal
benefit exceed  the marginal  cost of the level of secrecy  set by the nonetary
authority.  If  secrecy  is absent,  then  the  narginal  cost  of acquiring
jnforrnation  is zero and  the public would  become  perfectly informed  about
po1  icynaker  preferences  .
l,lhat  js the effect of changes  in secrecy  on  the public's optimal
t4forecast error variance? To answer  this  question,  assume  that the publicrs
optinization  problem  has  an  interior solution  and  totally differentiate the
equality in equation  (10a). 8y  doing  so,  we  obtain
2
(11)  dou/dS  =  -cp/C11.
l/ith C11  > 0, the direction of change  in the forecast error variance  induced
by a change  in secrecy  depends  on the sign of C12.  If  the marginal  cost of
acquiring information  increases  as secrecy  jncreases,  hence  C12  is
?
negative. With  C12  < 0, the sign  of do. / dS  is posjtive.  Thus,
increased  efforts  devoted  to secrecy  will  jnduce  a hlgher  optjmal  forecast
error vari  ance.
3.2 The  Monetary  Authonityrs  Problem
The  po1  icynaker's  problem  takes  into account  the effect of changes  jn
secrecy  on the optimal  forecast  eror  variance.  Since  the decision
regarding  secrecy  is taken  after the preference  shock  occurs,  the
polic)maker  chooses  the optinal effort  so as to maxinize  the following
.>2,
(12)  max  o:(S)  -  oi /?  -  A"/2 - K(S).
Cc
The  function KO represents  the costs assocjated  with increasing  secrecy
efforts and  is strjctly  convex. It  is also  assumed  K(0)  = 0 and  K(-) = -.
22
The  naximization  problem  is subject  to the constraints that ou  z  o.(S) and  S
:0.
In the agent's  maximization  problem,  we  found  that the forecdst error
variance  is positively related  to secrecy. It  is also  assumed  that the
marginal  increase  in forecast error variance  from  an incremental  increase  in
secrecy  decreases,  so  that o"2''{S)  is negative.
15The  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for the policymaker's  objective function are
represented  by:
(13a)  d'tsltr - y1)-  K,(S)  + 1,  s  0,
(b)  to^z'(s)(l  - r-) - K,(S)  +.1-lg =  0 'e  .,'  'l'  '2'
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(c)  r.[(o..  - o^(s))  | =  0
lvE
(d)  vS  =  0 '2
(e)  S:o
2?
(f)  (ou  - o.(s))  :  0,
where  1i > 0, i=1,2  denote  the Lagrangian  multipliers.  The  Kuhn-Tucker
conditions  incorporate  three  possibie  solutions,  with two  of these  being
corner  solutions.lll  The  meaning  of each  solutjon  will  be  considered
separately.  o.''( )  is the marginal  benefit of secrecy  and  represents  the
narginal inara]ra in the public's forecast error variance  due  to secrecJ.
K'( ) is the marginal  cost.
The  first  case  is the corner  solution  with S = 0.  With  5 = 0, the
optimal  degree  of secrecy  is zero.  This  case  is depicted  in Figure  1  wjth
MC1  as the relevant marginal  cost curve.  Since  the marginal  cost of effort
devoted  to additional secrecy  exceeds  the marginal  benefit at every  value of
S, private information  is effectively foregone.  Agents  can  costlessly
obtain informatjon  about  the monetary  authorityrs preference  shock,  and  the
16distribution  forecast errors degenerates.  l.lithout  private information, the
central bank  could  be better off  if  it  could  pre-commit  to a zero-growth
rule.
The  second  case  examines  the corner  solutjon characterized  by agents
not seeking  any information.  The  maximum  forecast error variance  is the
2
population  d'istribution, ou.  The  marginal  benefit curve, denoted  MB  in
Figure 1, indicates that the marginal  benefit of secrecy  falls  to zero for
ievels greater than Sg.  As the figure shows,  the rnarginal  cost curve,
denoted  MC2,  is not "equal  "  to marginal  benefit at any level of secrecy.
The  implication  is that the policymaker  !/ilI  choose  Sg  as  the optimal  level
of secrecy,  which is sufficient  to insure  that agents  wjll  not seek
jnformation  about  the contemporaneous  preference  shock.
In the thjrd  case,  the marginal  benefit and  marginal  costs of secrecy
are equal  meaning  that there js an interior  solution for  both the forecast
error variance  and  secrecy. Graphically,  the optimal level of secrecy,
rl
denoted  S , occurs  where  the l4B  curve  intersects MC3. At this  point, the
public  will  invest  in information  gathering  (Fed  watching)  while  at the same
time the central bank  will  opt for  some  level of secrecy.
The  costs and  benefits of secrecy  uitimately determine  v{hether  pre-
conmi  tment  is desirable  to the nonetary  authority.  If  the optimal level of
secrecy  succeeds  in creating a sufficient  information  asymmetry  (i.a., 
d
high enough),  then the nonetary  authority might  be better off  in a
discretionary  regime  than  in a "rules"  regime.l2l Thus,  the technology  of
secrecy  and  information  acquisition  may  play  a decisive  role in deterrnining
the type of monetary  institutions  (whether  rules or discretion) that arise.
1'7IV.  Surnnary
The  primary  incentive  for  agents  to monjtor  Federal  Reserve  behavior  js
the presence  of asynmetric  information. This note considers  the effects on
a macroeconomic  policy gane  of accounting  for  Fed  watching. Agents  choose
the optirnal  level of forecast enor  variance  based  on the cost of mon'itoring
the monetary  authority's  behavior. Since  agent's  information  acquisition
affects policymaker  welfare,  the Nash  equilibrium  will  determine  whether
people's information  "strategy"  results in the monetary  authority finding
discretion  or, alternatively, a rule to be  optimal  .  In other  words,  the
model  suggests  that the publicrs monitoring  Federal  Reserve  behavior  may
play a role in resolving the pre-cor  nitnent problem.
The  other aspect  which  information  acquisition addresses  is the
presence  of Federal  Reserve  secrecy. An  effective counter-  strategy  for  the
Federal  Reserve  is to raise the narginal cost of acquiring  information.  To
offset  the publjc's  incentive, the policyraker  may  become  more  secretive.
The  degree  of secrecy  rnay  ultimately determine  whether  pre-commitment  is
des  i  rabl  e.
1nAPPE  ND  I X
Analysis  of the Kuhn-Tucker  condjtions.
Case  I.  S  =  0.
If  S = 0,  '.n 
""2 
t  ."2.  Therefore,  from  equation  (13c),
2
yl  = 0.  Since  y, Z 0, this implies  that oe,(S)  - K,(S)  . O.
Therefore,  the marginal  costs of secrecy  are greater than  or equal  to
the marginal  benefits when  secrecy  is absent.
22




If  ou =  o., then  S > 0.  Therefore,  from  equation  (13d),  1, = 0.
Also,  Io.2'(S)(1  - y.) - K,(S)  + V^]  = 0 from  equation  (13b). Since tr  l' 
'2
2
y1  :'0,  this implies  that o.'(5) t  K'(S).




From  equations  (l3c) and  (13d),  y, = y" = 0.  Therefore,  fron
2rL
(13b)  o"'(S) = K'(S).  Therefore,  the marginal  benefit  of secrecy
equals  the narginal  cost.
19FOOTNOTES
1.  The  potential losses  due  to surprise  noney  creation are often
characterized  in the literature  as stemming  from labor contracting  models
such  as Gray  (1976)  and  Taylor (1980).  In effect,  agents  contract labor
services  with firns  for an expected  real wage  rate.  l.lith  noney  growth
pos'itively related to the rate of inflation,  unanticipated  money  shocks  mean
deviations from  the expected  real wage. It  js assumed  that firms are on the
marginal  product  of labor schedule  so that workers  supply  nore labor at a
lower  real wage  rate.  Workers,  therefore, are off  their  notional supply
curve  and, hence  are worse  off  due  to the surprise  money  growth.
Consequently,  the gains  from  surprise inflation  to the policymaker  are (at
least partially) offset by  the public,s  losses.
2. The  point of optimal  money  growth  is noot unless  the monetary  authority
values  unanticipated  inflation.  The  policymaker  would  choose  the path  of
money  growth  which  achieves  the price stability  goal  .
3. Here  the term  quality refers to the variance  of the current period
forecast error.
4. Actually, these  objectives  are spelled  out in the Full Employment  and
Balanced  Growth  Act of 1978  (also known  as the Humphrey-Hawk  i  ns Act).  In
testimony  to the House  Subcommitte  on Domestic  Monetary  Poljcy in March
1988,  Keran  identified these  two  goals  as being  forenost in policynakers'
objective  functj  on.
205.  The  model  is essentjal  ly that used  in Cukierman  and  Meltzer  (1985,f986).
The  main  difference is that Cukierman  and  Meltzer  focused  on a problem  with
serially  correlated preference  shocks. In our analysis, it  is assumed  that
preference  shocks  are not serially  correlated.
6. This assumption  maintains  the information  asymnetry  between  the nonetary
authority and  the public, not between  individuals.  The  quadratic  form in
equation  (5) reflects  an assumption  that the cost of forecast errors
increases  at a an increasing  rate.  Moreover,  the information  set upon  which
conditional expectations  of money  growth  also include  those  elenents  which
are  ttfrge.'l
7.  The  underlying  assumption  is that the variance  of the forecast error is
a monotonically  decreasing  function wjth respect  to the agent's  resource
t
expenditure.  0r, oo'  = f(R), with f'  < 0, where  R  is the agentrs  resource
expenditure.  Cteariy,  R is the true choice  varjable.  In order  to minimize
notation,  we  have  chosen  to substitute  d  as tfre  cho'ice  variable  in the
agents  objective  function, i.e.,  R  = r-ttdl  = C(re2).
8.  Perhaps  some  justification for the assumptjon  that E[vi1u1  - rflt  = 
d
'is necessary.  Fjrst, note  that vi = v! * ei, where  ei is the public's
prediction error of the policymaker's  preference  shock. Substituting for  vi
'in  the expression  above  yields E[(v! + ei)e11.  It  is assumed  that vi,  the
public's forecast  of the predjction  shock,  is orthogonal  to the forecast




2l9.  Studies  by Dotsey  (1987),  and  Tabelljni (1987)  also investigate  the
effects of secrecy. Dotsey  and  Tabelljni do not expljcitly  model  the
secrecy  decision.  Moreover,  the emphasis  in these  two  papers  is the effects
of secrecy  on observed  financial market  behavior.
10.  The  framework  used  to analyze  the optimal  degree  of secrecy  is
basical  ly a Stackleberg  game.  Since  jndividua'ls  do  not form  coalitions in
the model  ,  jt  seems  reasonable  to treat the Federal  Reserve  as a rrleader.rl
11.  Note  that the forecast enor  varianca,  o"2,  it  an increasing  functjon of
secrecy. Therefore,  the inequality constrainis effectively place  an upper
and  lower  bound  on the values  of S.  lJnfortunately,  it  is  impossible  to tell
r,rhich  constraint,  if  any, is binding  at the equilibrium. Moreover,  it  is
impossible  for both  boundary  conditions  to be  sinultaneously  satisfjed.
Consequently,  three  possibie  conditions  exist.  An  interior solution  marked
.)
by o"''  ( ) = K'( ).  It  js also  possible  for the obiect'ive  to be  negatively
sloped  for  a1  1 non-negative  values  of S so that the optjmal  value  occurs
when  S = 0.  Alternatively, the value  of the objective function may  be
positively sloped  over  the relevant  range  of S.  In this case,  the optimal  S
.2? occurs when  o; = o;.
12.  f{hether  soc  iety
publ  .ic's acquisition
is
of
better off will  depend  on the resources  lost  in the
i  nformati  on.
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